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We explore some empirical properties of gross international investment
positions. In a cross-section of countries, we …nd that more open coun-
tries with larger domestic …nancial markets tend to hold greater quantities
of foreign assets and liabilities. Keywords: international investment posi-
tions, international investment income ‡ows, asset trade.
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This paper empirically studies gross international investment po-
sitions. Although much research has focused on the determinants of net
capital ‡ows and external debt, gross holdings of foreign assets and liabil-
ities are arguably a better indicator of the extent of international capital
market activity. An interesting aspect of gross international investment
positions is that, as shown in section 3 below, there is considerable cross-
country heterogeneity in the level of cross-holdings of foreign assets and
liabilities.1 Our objective in this paper is to identify factors that explain
this cross-sectional variation.
Understanding the sources of cross-country heterogeneity in own-
ership levels of foreign assets and liabilities is important for a number of
reasons. First, the cross-section is one dimension along which theories
of international investment behavior can be investigated. Second, posi-
tive gross international investment positions may a¤ect macroeconomic
outcomes by reducing vulnerability to shocks, via the provision of in-
ternational investment income ‡ows that are imperfectly correlated with
domestic output ‡uctuations. Third, the scale of international asset trade
may provide a volume-based measure of …nancial openness, just as ex-
port/GDP and import/GDP ratios play this role with respect to openness
to trade in goods and services. For this purpose, it is useful to identify
the systemic component to …nancial openness, just as researchers adjust
volume-based measures of trade openness for factors such as population,
1See also Golub (1990). Golub studied gross capital ‡ows but, unlike this paper, he
did not seek to explain the variation in foreign assets and liabilities across countries.
1land area and proximity to major markets (Lee 1993, Frankel and Romer
1996).
One important role played by ownership of foreign assets and
liabilities is to smooth income, by delinking GNP and GDP.2 In this re-
gard, we would expect that countries that have a greater need for income-
smoothing to hold greater quantities of foreign assets and liabilities. For
instance, is it the case that those countries that face a more volatile en-
vironment tend to have larger gross international investment positions?
Second, holding …xed these potential gains, the costs of engaging in in-
ternational asset trade also a¤ect the propensity to hold positive gross
international investment positions. As is developed in section 2 below,
such theoretical considerations guide the choice of regressors in our em-
pirical analysis.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses
the factors that may help to explain cross-country variation in gross in-
ternational investment positions. The empirical analysis begins in section
3, which considers the determinants of cross-country variation in the size
of gross holdings of foreign assets and liabilities. Section 4 concludes.
Section II: Cross-Sectional Determinants
In this subsection, we discuss some potential determinants of
variation across countries in the level of cross-holdings of international
assets and liabilities, as a precursor to the empirical work in section 3.
We focus on variables that may raise the desirability of income smoothing
2See Svensson (1988), Obstfeld (1995) and Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1996).
2and/or reduce the barriers to international asset trade.3
Since our interest is in gross international investment positions,
our index of cross-holdings is a simple average of foreign assets and liabil-










We consider a range of variables that may help to determine cross-country
variation in BYi. An interesting question is whether countries that are
heavily engaged in the international trade of goods and services are also
highly integrated in asset trade. A positive association between trade
openness and international investment positions may arise for a number
of reasons. First, trade openness may raise volatility and hence the desire
for income-smoothing.4 Second, international trade in goods and services
in itself generates parallel …nancial ‡ows (i.e., international payments and
receipts) and …rms may wish to hedge the riskiness of these ‡ows in their
investment and treasury strategies. Third, working in the opposite direc-
tion, the cross-holdings of assets and liabilities that are the results of FDI
may in turn generate increased trade in goods and services.
Country size may also matter. One reason is that the establish-
ment of domestic …nancial markets may entail …xed set-up costs and it
3As suggested by Grilli (1989) and Feldstein (1994), shielding wealth from domestic
tax authorities provides an additional motivation for holding foreign assets and liabilities.
However, we do not have the data to empirically investigate this proposition.
4Rodrik (1998) arguesthat more openeconomiesface more volatile environoments and
hence desire larger government sectors as a social insurance mechanism. International
asset cross-holdings are an alternative method by which income can be smoothed that
is potentially more powerful since it involves cross-country transfers rather than just
domestic transfers.
3may make sense for a small country to “free ride” on the existence of deep
…nancial and capital markets in other, larger economies. For instance,
Grilli (1989) poses the scenario of Belgian …rms and households perform-
ing all their …nancial transactions in the London markets. Another good
example is Ireland, whose banks relied on London for inter-bank funds
until a domestic money market was established in 1972. Finally, a further
reason why size may be a relevant factor is that smaller countries may be
more specialized, with greater vulnerability to external shocks and hence
with more volatile national output levels.
If the formation of international …nancial linkages similarly in-
volves …xed set-up costs, the degree of international …nancial integration
may also be positively related to a country’s level of per capita output.
Alternatively, by analogy to Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1996), a pos-
itive relationship between gross international investment positions and
per capita output could be motivated by the existence of …xed costs in
acquiring information about international …nancial opportunities.
As has been suggested above, countries that face a more volatile
environment should be more anxious to smooth income by increasing
cross-holdings of foreign assets and liabilities. We consider indicators of
historical volatility in GDP, in the terms of trade and in in‡ation. Even
if GDP is stable, ‡uctuations in the terms of trade generate instability in
purchasing power.5 We allow for in‡ation volatility since in‡ation a¤ects
the net incomes of holders of unindexed nominal assets and liabilities.6
5Of course, if terms of trade movements o¤set shifts in GDP, the e¤ect is to stabilize
real income. However, there is no strong relationship between output and the terms of
trade in the data (Zimmermann, 1997).
6Bacchetta and van Wincoop (1997) and Neumeyer (1998) analyze nominal risk in
4Finally, we ask whether countries with well developed domestic
…nancial markets are more likely to engage in international asset trade. A
developed domestic …nancial sector facilitates the sale of domestic assets
to foreign investors. In addition, it is plausible that …rms and households
that are accustomed to domestic trade in assets may also be more attuned
to the bene…ts of holding international investments in smoothing income.
Accordingly, the basic speci…cation for the regression analysis in
section 3 is
BYi = ® + ¯Xi + °Zi + "i (2)
where Xi is the trade openness variable and Zi is a set of the other po-
tential determinants discussed above.
Section III: Empirical Analysis
The dataon foreign assets and liabilities are taken from the Inter-
national Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics CD-ROM.7
Restricted by data availability, there are nineteen OECD countries in the
sample, as listed in Table [1]. Table [2] reports some basic data for these
countries over the period 1981-95. Column (1) shows the total interna-
tional investment position, as de…ned in equation [2] above. For most
countries, gross international investment positions are clearly rising over
time. There are also considerable di¤erences in the sizes of gross interna-
tional investment positions across countries (Figure 1 displays the data in
international asset trade.
7Since April 1997, line 79 of the IFS has reported data on the composition of inter-
national investment positions for a limited number of countries.
5Table 1: Country List
Australia AUS 1986-96 Japan JAP 1980-96
Austria AUT 1980-96 Netherlands NET 1980-96
Belgium BEL 1981-94 Norway NOR 1988-93
Canada CAN 1980-96 New Zealand NZL 1990-96
Denmark DEN 1991-95 Spain ESP 1980-95
Finland FIN 1975-96 Sweden SWE 1982-96
France FRA 1987-96 Switzerland SWI 1984-95
Germany GER 1980-95 United Kingdom GBR 1980-96
Iceland ICE 1988-95 United States USA 1980-96
Italy ITA 1972-96
Data available on international investment positions in International Financial Statistics.
graphical form for 1991-95). Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland and
the United Kingdom all have gross international investment positions in
excess of 100 percent of GDP while, at the other extreme, Iceland, Italy,
Japan, Norway and Spain have positions that are less than 50 percent of
GDP.
Columns (2)-(4) show data on three international investment
subcategories: foreign direct investment, portfolio equity and portfolio
debt positions. (The category “other investments” is not reported and
is the di¤erence between the total and the sum of these subcomponents.
Other investments comprise the holdings of the monetary authority, the
general government, reserves, the banking system and other sectors.) It
is potentially important to separately consider these subcategories. One
reason is that they may di¤er in their risk-sharing properties. For instance,
Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (1996) speculate that equity liabilities (FDI or
6Table 2: Summary Data
Total FDI Equity Debt INCP INCM
Australia 1981-85
1986-90 0.493 0.193 0.052 0.029 0.01 0.045
1991-95 0.594 0.228 0.087 0.047 0.011 0.046
Austria 1981-85 0.657 0.029 0.004 0.096 0.046 0.051
1986-90 0.747 0.04 0.011 0.145 0.046 0.053
1991-95 0.712 0.055 0.022 0.195 0.047 0.053
Belgium 1981-85 1.499 0.118 0.03 0.168 0.267 0.26
1986-90 1.988 0.225 0.081 0.311 0.276 0.259
1991-95 2.118 0.339 0.134 0.393 0.423 0.382
Canada 1981-85 0.553 0.153 0.03 0.117 0.015 0.051
1986-90 0.583 0.168 0.036 0.161 0.016 0.054
1991-95 0.682 0.189 0.053 0.229 0.017 0.051
Denmark 1981-85
1986-90
1991-95 0.928 0.121 0.045 0.276 0.133 0.169
Finland 1981-85 0.349 0.021 0.043 0.013 0.036
1986-90 0.428 0.045 0.007 0.095 0.019 0.041
1991-95 0.671 0.078 0.034 0.246 0.018 0.063
France 1981-85
1986-90 0.61 0.06 0.045 0.076 0.038 0.039
1991-95 0.754 0.148 0.054 0.127 0.074 0.079
7Total FDI Equity Debt INCP INCM
Germany 1981-85 0.38 0.042 0.018 0.052 0.025 0.021
1986-90 0.509 0.051 0.036 0.095 0.031 0.023
1991-95 0.656 0.067 0.053 0.147 0.044 0.038
Iceland 1981-85
1986-90 0.348 0.015 0.005 0.043
1991-95 0.39 0.02 0.002 0.005 0.006 0.041
Italy 1981-85 0.299 0.027 0.004 0.007 0.012 0.022
1986-90 0.334 0.048 0.009 0.022 0.011 0.021
1991-95 0.483 0.066 0.014 0.12 0.025 0.041
Japan 1981-85 0.22 0.016 0.015 0.013
1986-90 0.459 0.024 0.027 0.02
1991-95 0.465 0.032 0.044 0.093 0.037 0.028
Netherlands 1981-85 1.021 0.226 0.098 0.074 0.085 0.081
1986-90 1.271 0.293 0.159 0.133 0.084 0.08
1991-95 1.466 0.364 0.227 0.18 0.086 0.084
New Zealand 1981-85
1986-90 0.511 0.131 0.012 0.129 0.014 0.061
1991-95 0.647 0.242 0.017 0.151 0.007 0.068
8Total FDI Equity Debt INCP INCM
Norway 1981-85
1986-90 0.504 0.028 0.125 0.035 0.057
1991-95 0.452 0.038 0.122 0.023 0.047
Spain 1981-85 0.28 0.027 0.002 0.002 0.009 0.023
1986-90 0.3 0.052 0.015 0.01 0.008 0.016
1991-95 0.488 0.102 0.028 0.065 0.017 0.028
Sweden 1981-85 0.426 0.164 0.015 0.013 0.022 0.041
1986-90 0.572 0.238 0.036 0.027 0.031 0.044
1991-95 0.945 0.395 0.177 0.102 0.044 0.078
Switzerland 1981-85 1.851 0.187 0.272 0.348 0.121 0.053
1986-90 2.03 0.229 0.316 0.401 0.115 0.05
1991-95 2.191 0.301 0.41 0.41 0.106 0.049
UK 1981-85 1.451 0.153 0.073 0.096 0.15 0.143
1986-90 1.747 0.202 0.155 0.2 0.129 0.121
1991-95 1.977 0.223 0.218 0.302 0.122 0.116
US 1981-85 0.28 0.062 0.018 0.038 0.026 0.018
1986-90 0.413 0.111 0.037 0.068 0.026 0.023
1991-95 0.503 0.142 0.067 0.104 0.022 0.021
Total is average aggregate holdings of foreign assets and liabilities. FDI is foreign direct investment subcomponent; Equity
is portfolio equity subcomponent; Debt is portfolio debt subcomponent. INCP and INCM are factor income in‡ows and
out‡ows respectively. All variables are expressed as ratios to GDP. Source: International Financial Statistics CD-ROM.
9portfolio equity) may have more attractive payout characteristics than
non-contingent debt liabilities, since the yields on these liabilities may
move in a procyclical fashion.8
There is a general positive trend in each of these subcategories
in all countries. Figure 2 charts the 1991-95 data for foreign direct invest-
ment positions and shows a wide dispersion: seven countries have holdings
below 10 percent of GDP; …ve countries are between 10 and 20 percent;
and another seven countries have holdings above 20 percent of GDP. Port-
folio cross-holdings are aggregated across debt and equity subcomponents
in Figure 3. With the exception of Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland
and the United Kingdom, it appears that international portfolio invest-
ment positions are relatively more uniform across countries.
We turn now to analyzing the determinants of the cross-country
heterogeneity in the levels of gross international investment positions. In
what follows, we focus on the observations for the most recent cross-
section 1991-95, which has the most complete availability of data. The
1990s period also has the merit that capital controls had been almost
completely eliminated for this group of countries by the early 1990s.
Results are reported in Tables [3]-[7]. In Table [3], the dependent
variable is based on the aggregate international investment position. The
speci…cation in column (1) just includes trade openness as a regressor,
which enters positively and signi…cantly.9 The point estimate indicates
that raising openness by one standard deviation from its mean (0.29 to
8That said, the real return on nominal, unindexed debt will be sensitive to real
exchange rate ‡uctuations and so may also be capable of providing a contingent return.
9Trade openness is the average of exports and imports as a ratio to GDP.
10Table 3: International Investment Positions: Total
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
C 0.14 -4.42 -8.04 -0.43 0.76 -3.4 1.2
(.14) (1.2) (7.2) (.14) (.53) (6.4) (3.9)
OPEN 2.67 3.76 2.65 3.64 2.75 2.26 2.39
(.55) (.39) (.52) (.48) (.74) (1.22) (1.13)




FIN 2.51 2.03 2.09
(.76) (.37) (.45)
VTT -1.9 -8.34 -9.4
(4.5) (4.67) (4.5)
VY -32.2 -44.4 -32.5
(37.7) (44.0) (38.2)
VPI 3.3 38.4 34.2
(10.9) (18.5) (17.5)
R2 0.353 0.49 0.381 0.695 0.438 0.828 0.819
SE 0.484 0.443 0.488 0.346 0.497 0.318 0.312
N 19 19 19 18 18 18 18
Dependent variable is total cross-holdings of foreign assets and liabilities, as de…ned in Table 2. Estimation is ordinary
least squares, with Newey-West standard errors. OPEN is average of exports plus imports, expressed as a ratio to GDP,
in 1991. SIZE is log of total GDP in international dollars in 1990. YC is log of GDP per capita in international dollars in
1990. FIN is turnover value of the trades of domestic shares on domestic exchanges over the year divided by the average
value of domestic shares listed on domestic exchanges, averaged over 1976-93. VTT is standard deviation of the growth
rate of the terms of trade; VY is standard deviation of the national GDP growth rate minus the world output growth rate;
VPI is standard deviation of the national in‡ation rate minus the world in‡ation rate. Sources: OPEN, VTT and VY
are constructed from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators CD-ROM. SIZE and YC are from the Penn World
Tables version 5.6. FIN is from Levine and Zervos (1998). In‡ation data are from the International Financial Statistics
CD-ROM.
11Table 4: International Investment Positions: FDI
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
C 0.052 -0.68 -3.5 -0.002 0.1 -3.8 -0.08
(.041) (.43) (1.1) (.05) (.13) (1.7) (1.1)
OPEN 0.4 0.57 0.39 0.51 0.4 0.23 0.34
(.15) (.15) (.13) (.12) (.25) (.28) (.28)




FIN 0.23 0.12 0.17
(.15) (.15) (.13)
VTT -0.28 -0.67 -1.5
(1.7) (1.8) (1.9)
VY 0.2 -9.3 0.2
(8.6) (9.3) (9.4)
VPI -1.4 8.1 4.7
(2.3) (3.8) (4.4)
R2 0.188 0.272 0.318 0.311 0.252 0.529 0.379
SE 0.111 0.108 0.105 0.104 0.117 0.105 0.115
N 19 19 19 18 19 18 18
Dependent variable is FDI component of cross-holdings of foreign assets and liabilities, as de…ned in Table 2. See note to
Table 3.
12Table 5: International Investment Positions: Portfolio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
C 0.06 -1.3 -3.5 -0.16 0.23 -0.84 0.96
(.04) (.6) (2.9) (.07) (.15) (2.1) (1.3)
OPEN 0.68 1.02 0.67 1.06 0.6 0.41 0.46
(.17) (.19) (.17) (.17) (.21) (.31) (.28)




FIN 0.98 0.98 1
(.33) (.16) (.2)
VTT -1.3 -3.4 -3.8
(1.7) (1.2) (1.3)
VY -1.7 -7.3 -2.6
(12.9) (11.7) (10.5)
VPI -1.3 8.8 7.2
(3.4) (4.4) (4.0)
R2 0.212 0.334 0.261 0.702 0.306 0.838 0.852
SE 0.176 0.167 0.176 0.109 0.182 0.094 0.094
N 19 19 19 18 19 18 18
Dependent variable is portfolio component of cross-holdings of foreign assets and liabilities. See note to Table 3.
13Table 6: International Investment Positions: Equity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
C 0.01 -0.52 -2.2 -0.12 0.08 -1.2 0.74
(.03) (.33) (1.7) (.05) (.09) (1.3) (.68)
OPEN 0.28 0.407 0.28 0.49 0.27 0.06 0.11
(.13) (.19) (.14) (.14) (.17) (.1) (.14)




FIN 0.58 0.58 0.6
(.19) (.1) (.14)
VTT -.29 -1.5 -2.0
(.87) (1.1) (1.4)
VY -2.1 -9.2 -4.2
(7.9) (4.9) (5.0)
VPI -.10 6.4 4.8
(1.8) (2.5) (3.1)
R2 0.126 0.189 0.195 0.66 0.159 0.828 0.771
SE 0.101 0.10 0.10 0.065 0.11 0.058 0.064
N 18 18 18 17 18 17 17
Dependent variable is equity component of cross-holdings of foreign assets and liabilities, as de…ned in Table 2. See note
to Table 3.
14Table 7: International Investment Positions: Debt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
C 0.04 -0.7 -1.4 -0.03 0.12 0.39 0.42
(.03) (.5) (1.4) (.05) (.09) (1.6) (1.2)
OPEN 0.45 0.64 0.45 0.61 0.37 0.31 0.31
(.13) (.16) (.13) (.14) (.17) (.29) (.28)




FIN 0.34 0.39 0.39
(.16) (.08) (.08)
VTT -0.96 -2.04 -2.05
(.91) (.82) (.75)
VY 3.2 2.4 2.5
(6.9) (10.7) (10.4)
VPI -2.2 1.9 1.9
(1.8) (3.6) (3.4)
R2 0.285 0.39 0.31 0.56 0.449 0.684 0.684
SE 0.097 0.092 0.098 0.075 0.093 0.078 0.074
N 19 19 19 18 19 18 18
Dependent variable is debt component of cross-holdings of foreign assets and liabilities, as de…ned in Table 2. See note to
Table 3.
150.42) increases the aggregate international investment position from its
mean of 90 percent of GDP to 125 percent, an economically large e¤ect.
Figure 4 displays the scatter plot of total cross-holdings of foreign assets
and liabilities against trade openness and a strong positive relationship is
clearly evident in the raw data.
In columns (2)-(4), country size, output per capitaand a measure
of domestic …nancial sophistication are individually added to the basic
speci…cation. Country size is measured as the log of total GDP in 1990;
output as the log of GDP per capita in 1990; and domestic …nancial
sophistication as the turnover value of the trades of domestic shares on
domestic exchanges divided by the average value of the domestic shares
listed on domestic exchanges.10 In each case, the signi…cance of the trade
openness variable is una¤ected. In addition, country size and …nancial
sophistication each enter positively and signi…cantly but output per capita
is insigni…cant. The positive impact of country size is at odds with the
theoretical predictions discussed above: however, size is not signi…cant
in the broader speci…cations in columns (6)-(7). The positive association
between domestic …nancial sophistication and the extent of international
cross-holdings of assets and liabilities is line with our theoretical discussion
and remains robust in columns (6)-(7). Figure 5 displays the scatter plot
of the aggregate international investment position against the …nancial
sophistication measure. The …gure shows that the partial relationship is
10GDP is measured in international dollars from the Penn World Tables version 5.6.
The …nancial development variable is from Levine and Zervos (1998) and is averaged over
1976-93. The population data are from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators
CD-ROM.
16quite robust in the data.11
The regression reported in column (5) adds the volatility mea-
sures for the terms of trade, output and in‡ation to the baseline speci…-
cation.12 Again, the trade openness variable remains signi…cant. In this
speci…cation, the volatility measures are individually and jointly insignif-
icant.13 Columns (6)-(7) report broader speci…cations: all the regressors
are included in column (6) and output per capita (which is never sig-
ni…cant) is excluded in column (7). As indicated, trade openness and
…nancial sophistication remain robustly signi…cant. In‡ation volatility is
now signi…cantly positive and terms of trade volatility is signi…cantly neg-
ative. This latter result can be rationalized if terms of term volatility is
associated with exchange rate volatility, making foreign currency income
streams more unstable in terms of domestic currency.
In Table [4], we repeat the analysis for international cross-holdings
of foreign direct investment positions. As before, trade openness is signi…-
cant in columns (1)-(5) but its explains less of the cross-country variation
in foreign direct investment positions and its individual e¤ect weakens in
the crowded speci…cations in columns (6)-(7). Country size is again in-
11It is possible that the gross international investment positions of …nancial centres
are mismeasured since an activity of these centres is to intermediate trade between
non-resident entities. In results not reported, we attempted to address this concern by
excluding the assets and liabilities of the banking sector — as the sector most involved
in intermediation — and obtained very similar results.
12The volatility of the terms of trade is measured as the standard deviation of the log
change in the terms of trade. The volatility of output and in‡ation are constructed as
the standard deviation of the di¤erential between domestic and world growth rates in
output and the price level respectively. All the volatility measures are based on data
over 1970-90. These data are from the International Financial Statistics CD-ROM.
13The p-value from a Wald test of the joint signi…cance of the three volatility measures
is 0.12.
17signi…cant but output per capita is signi…cantly positive in both columns
(3) and (6). This positive e¤ect of output per capita on the size of gross
foreign direct investment positions plausibly re‡ects the greater propen-
sity of …rms in the most advanced countries to establish foreign a¢liates
and, conversely, the relative attractiveness of these countries as host lo-
cations for foreign direct investment. Domestic …nancial sophistication is
not a signi…cant indicator of foreign direct investment activity and there
is not much evidence that the volatility measures have a bearing on for-
eign direct investment positions: only in column (6) is in‡ation volatility
signi…cant and the size of the e¤ect is much smaller than in Table [3].
We turn to international portfolio investment positions in Table
[5]. The results are very similar to those for the aggregate investment po-
sitions reported in Table [3]. In Tables [6] and [7], we decompose portfolio
positions into holdings of equity and debt respectively. In broad terms,
the results do not vary much for these subcomponents. However, trade
openness is more powerful in explaining international debt holdings than
equity positions. In addition, there is some evidence in column (6) of Ta-
ble [6] that smaller countries have larger cross-holdings of foreign equity
assets and liabilities and in‡ation volatility appears to increase interna-
tional equity positions but not international debt positions.
In summary, according to the results of this section, countries
that trade a lot and have sophisticated domestic …nancial markets also
have large gross international investment positions. To the extent that
trade openness is associated with greater volatility, this …nding supports
the notion that more volatile countries should hold greater quantities of
18foreign assets and liabilities. However, this relationship can be alterna-
tively interpreted as simply saying that open countries tend to trade a lot
in assets as well as in goods and services. Similarly, well-developed domes-
tic …nancial markets plausibly reduce transactions costs, broadly de…ned,
and hence further promote international trade in assets. In terms of the
direct volatility measures, there is partial evidence supporting a positive
relationship between in‡ation volatility and the size of gross international
investment positions but the direction is reversed for terms of trade volatil-
ity. Finally, the evidence on foreign direct investment positions suggests
that foreign direct investment activity is driven by structural factors that
are correlated with the level of development, as measured by output per
capita.
Section IV: Conclusions
The evidence presented in this paper suggests that, in a cross-
section of countries, gross international investment positions are positively
associated with trade openness and a large domestic …nancial market. Al-
though the openness result could be rationalized as providing a link be-
tween volatility and the propensity to hold foreign assets and liabilities,
more direct explanations are that those factors that stimulate trade in
goods also stimulate trade in assets and, moreover, trade in goods and
in assets are complementary activities. A trade-based explanation is also
supported by the positive relationship between the size of the domestic
…nancial sector and the size of gross international investment positions
since a sophisticated domestic …nancial market almost surely reduces the
19transactions costs incurred in international asset trade. Mixed results
were obtained on the relationship between cross-holdings of foreign assets
and liabilities and various volatility indicators. That said, the role of in-
‡ation volatility perhaps warrants further exploration. Finally, it is worth
noting that the evidence of Tesar and Werner (1995) that the pattern of
international portfolio investment is in‡uenced by geographical proximity
and common language ties similarly suggests that asset trade is not too
dissimilar to trade in goods.
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Fig. 1: Total cross-holdings of foreign assets and liabilities as a
ratio to GDP, 1991-95.









































































































Fig. 2: Cross-holdings of Foreign Direct Investment Assets and
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Fig. 5: Partial relationship between …nancial sophistication and
total cross-holdings, controlling for trade openness.
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